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Arab-Israeli confict 1948-1996

Overview 1987-1996

Stephen Dixon
Kirrawee High School


 

Part of this tutorial first appeared in Teaching History, the journal of the History Teachers' Association of NSW, in June 1996.

Outcomes

Key features and issues:

From this tutorial you will learn about the peace process:

Contents

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Timeline

1988, December: The PLO recognises Israel's right to exist and renounces "all forms of terrorism".

1991, January: Gulf War begins.

1992, August: Labour Party elected in Israel. Yitzhak Rabin becomes Prime Minister.

1993, September: Washington Agreement on Palestinian self-rule.

1994, July: Arafat returns to Gaza.

1994, October: Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.

1995, September: Israeli-Palestinian accord extends Palestinian self-rule on the West Bank.

1995, November: Yitzhak Rabin assassinated.

1996, January: Yasser Arafat elected as President of the Palestinian entity.

On 30 November 1987, Time magazine ran an article entitled A Land That History Forgot. Describing the depressed conditions of life in Gaza, it quoted the lament of a Palestinian woman: 'There is no way of getting out of this life unless a miracles occurs.'[1] On 9 December the Intifada (Arabic for Uprising) erupted. Paradoxically, this outbreak of violence, typified by confrontations between stone-throwing Arab youths and the Israeli army, became the catalyst leading to the fragile peace process now being experienced in the Middle East.

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The Intifada

The initial demonstrations and clashes were not orchestrated by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), but were a spontaneous response to the mounting frustration with Israeli army occupation felt in Gaza and the West Bank. The growth in popularity of militant religious groups such as Islamic Jihad and, from February 1988, Hamas, helped to channel this frustration into direct action.

The rioting was at first confined to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but by the beginning of 1988 had spread to East Jerusalem, then to several Arab towns and villages within Israel. There followed a general strike during which Arab towns throughout Israel closed their shops and schools. Some 170,000 Israeli Arabs refused to report for work, as did 80,000 Palestinians from the territories. The strike was a blow to the Israeli economy which had become heavily dependent on Arab labour.

The spread of the rebellion into Israel itself alarmed the Israelis. Fearful of subversion by a united front of Arabs inside and outside Israel, the newspaper Ha'aretz said: "The uprising is writing on our wall even more serious than the bloody riots of the past two weeks in the territories."[2]

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Israeli Army tactics and international reaction

The reaction of the Israeli army, the enforcers of law and order within the Occupied Territories, was firm and swift. Yitzhak Rabin (Defence Minister in the coalition government) ordered his soldiers to use live ammunition against the rioters. By January 1988 the Israelis had tried tear gas, rubber and live bullets, mass arrests, imprisonment and deportations—all failed to quell the rioting. Rabin then introduced the "break bones" policy saying, "No demonstrators have died from being thwacked on the head."[3] Soldiers wielded boots, batons and rifle butts against Palestinian men, women and children indiscriminately. Israeli officials argued that the policy was far more humane than the earlier approach of using live ammunition.

Israeli army actions, broadcast on news bulletins around the world, brought a wave of international condemnation. King Hussein of Jordan and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia professed their sympathy for the actions of the Palestinians. Even the United States, usually a reliable ally of Israel, joined in the criticism and refused to veto a UN Security Council resolution to "strongly deplore" Israeli peace keeping tactics.

Israeli Prime Minister and Likud party leader Yitzhak Shamir was resolute in response: "There is no force in the world... which will prevent settlement by the people of Israel in all parts of the land of Israel."[4] Tales of Israeli army violence continued to damage the image of Israel in the eyes of the world. It was reported that in the West bank village of Salim on 5 February 1988, four suspected riot leaders were ordered to lie on the ground and an army bulldozer was ordered to push a mound of earth over them. The victims were dug out alive by the villagers after the soldiers left.[5]

It was becoming clear to the outside world that efforts to end the unrest were futile unless a negotiation process leading to some form of Palestinian self-rule was started. US Secretary of State, George Schultz, set out a three-point peace plan in February. It envisioned an international conference leading to interim self-rule for Palestinians, then to talks on the final arrangements for the Occupied Territories. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, leader of the Labour Party in the governing coalition, backed the plan and was prepared to countenance the idea of trading land for peace. Shamir firmly opposed the plan, believing that the uprising could be crushed before the Israeli elections due in November 1988. He was supported by a survey within Israel which showed that only 19% of the population favoured withdrawal from the territories. Despite visits by Shamir to Washington and by Schultz to the Middle East, the plan stalled. Meanwhile, within the territories the Intifada intensified. In March a two-day general strike by Palestinians was met with a ban on deliveries of gasoline to Palestinian towns and a nightly curfew throughout the Gaza Strip.

The PLO had become involved in the Intifada by early 1988. On 7 March, a bus hijacking in southern Israel left three Israeli civilians dead. The Israelis identified Khalil al-Wazir, better known as Abu Jihad, as the mastermind behind the hijacking. A founding member of Fatah, the major Palestinian resistance group, Abu Jihad was second only to Yasser Arafat in the military arm of the PLO. In April, a special Israeli commando unit raided Abu Jihad's home in Tunis and shot him dead.

By August 1988, a measure of calm had returned to the Occupied Territories, but at a price for both sides. Schools had been closed since the beginning of the year and the Israeli army was going through a ritual of curfews, mass arrests, the demolition of rioters' homes, the destruction of crops and deportations. Nearly 5,000 Palestinians were in gaol for their alleged part in the uprising. The lid was being kept on the unrest, but only at the cost of using 11,000 soldiers for the purpose. Even some Israeli army officers were admitting that they could see no end to it all.

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Jordan cuts its ties with the West Bank

A dramatic change in the political situation of the region came in mid-August 1988, when King Hussein of Jordan renounced all ties between his country and the West Bank. Jordan had directly ruled the West Bank from 1950 until its occupation by the victorious Israeli army after the 1967 war. Even after the Israeli occupation Jordan had paid the salaries of teachers, health workers and other officials in the region, maintained the hospitals and the mosques, and allowed some 75,000 Palestinians to hold Jordanian passports.

King Hussein had become frustrated by the attitudes of a variety of groups concerning Jordan's role in the West Bank. He resented criticism from other Arab states that he was trying to usurp the PLO's role. At the Arab summit in Algiers in June 1988, Arab leaders had refused to honour past financial commitments to assist Jordan with the expenses of running the West Bank, but insisted on reiterating their position that the PLO was the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. Despite backing President Reagan's attempts for peace, Hussein felt he had received little support from Washington, which had declined to press Israel to accept a land for peace exchange. Finally, his action, which effectively handed over responsibility for the West Bank to the PLO, was designed to put an end to the claims of right-wing Israelis who argued that Palestinians already had a national home in the shape of Jordan. Hussein's blunt statement, "Jordan is not Palestine", undermined the plans of those who saw this as a solution to the Palestinian problem.

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The PLO recognises Israel

Attention now turned to the question of whether the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people, was prepared to recognise the state of Israel. The Palestinian National Charter of July 1968 had declared Palestine, within the boundaries of the former British mandate, to be an indivisible territorial unit, and had called for armed struggle to secure its liberation and the "elimination of Zionism in Palestine". This objective, translated in many minds as "the destruction of Israel", seemed to be confirmed by the actions of the PLO and other terrorist groups in the years that followed.

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The effects of the Intifada

First, the Intifada had not only placed the issue of the Middle East in the forefront of world attention, it had also aroused an unprecedented wave of international sympathy for the Palestinian cause and a feeling that something should be done. However, as the course of the Intifada had shown, Israel could not be removed from the Occupied Territories by Palestinian action alone. Furthermore, Israel had a firm policy of refusing to talk with the PLO, which it regarded as a terrorist organisation. For the Palestinians to make any progress, it was necessary to enlist the aid of the world's major powers, but of these the Soviet Union was preoccupied with its own internal problems. It was to the West, and principally the USA, that the Palestinians had to turn if they wanted assistance to lever the Israelis out of Gaza and the West Bank.

The American position had been laid down in 1975 in meetings between Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. The Americans had promised that they would not talk to the PLO until it had recognised the state of Israel and its right to exist, and renounced the use of terrorism.

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Steps to recognition

Within the PLO there were conflicting pressures. Moderates realised the need to make some concessions to win American support for negotiations, while hard-liners insisted on no change to the traditional policy. Outside the organisation Egypt, Jordan and Iraq urged Arafat to adopt a more moderate approach. Through the closing months of 1988 intense diplomatic activity led to a series of meetings, advances, retreats and semantic word plays as the PLO sought to express its policies in a formula acceptable to the USA. The most notable steps were:

Within four hours of this pronouncement American Secretary of State, George Schultz, announced that the USA would open negotiations with the PLO. Reaction in Israel to Shultz's announcement was swift and bitter. Shamir, who had won the November elections by the slimmes of margins and therefore again headed a coalition government, condemned Arafat's words as a "monumental act of deception" and insisted that Israel would not alter its refusal to talk to the PLO.[7]

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A return to stalemate

By this time, the close of 1988, the first anniversary of the Intifada had come and gone. More than 7,000 Palestinians had been injured, 15,000 arrested, 12,000 gaoled, 34 deported and 318 killed by the Israeli army. Eleven Israelis had been killed by Palestinians, along with a number of Palestinians executed by their fellow Arabs, usually on the grounds of alleged cooperation with the Israeli occupation forces.

After the activity of 1988 the Arab-Israeli conflict settled into a frustrating and largely inactive phase for the next two years. James Baker succeeded George Schultz as US Secretary of State and brought his own plan calling for a conference which would include a Palestinian delegation. For the Israelis the sticking point was their refusal to accept any PLO members in this delegation, nor even Palestinians from East Jerusalem or outside the Occupied Territories.

On the second anniversary of the Intifada thousands of Israeli peace activists marched silently in Jerusalem to demand talks with the PLO. The uprising itself had changed in character since its inception. Mass confrontations had been replaced by cat-and-mouse taunting of Israeli soldiers by youths throwing stones or firebombs. Sixty per cent of the violent activity was now being carried out by children aged 13 or younger. As the Intifada settled into a predictable routine and the hope of peace talks faded, the Middle East spotlight moved from the fate of the Palestinians to the more dramatic events centred on Iraq and Kuwait.

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The Gulf War and its effects

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. Four days later the UN Security Council adopted a trade embargo against Iraq and US President Bush called for collective action to enforce the embargo. By November it had been decided that force would be necessary to dislodge the Iraqis from Kuwait, and when Saddam Hussein failed to meet a UN imposed deadline to leave Kuwait by 15 January 1991, two days later a US-led coalition of forces launched an attack. After 43 days the Iraqis had been forced from Kuwait. The war had several repercussions for the progress of the Arab-Israeli conflict:

Although the actions of the PLO during the Gulf War seemed to have seriously damaged the hopes for negotiations over the future of the Palestinians, it was only a matter of months after the conclusion of the Gulf War that the diplomatic activity resumed. There were several reasons for this:

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The peace talks begin

In November 1991, peace talks began in Madrid, attended by representatives of Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the USA. Little was achieved as the speakers postured to the world rather than talked to each other. They did agree that the next round of talks would be held in Washington. While little of substance was gained in Madrid, the Palestinian delegation (which still excluded the PLO on Israel's insistence) impressed by their presentation of a moderate and professional image.

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The emergence of Hamas

No progress was made in the peace talks during 1992. The frustrations that this caused among the Palestinians opened the way for the emergence of Hamas (meaning zeal). The movement, which takes its name from an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, had been formed in February 1988 with the following policies:

Hamas began with an emphasis on the provision of schooling, medical clinics and mosques, but it also established a military wing. In mid-1991 the organisation, largely funded by Iran, became more openly militant and began attacking Israeli targets with home-made bombs. By the end of 1992 they had substantial support within the Occupied Territories and were stepping up their activities. The Israelis hit back on 17 December 1992, by exiling a group of 415 alleged Islamic activists to Lebanon. The government of Lebanon refused to accept the expelled Palestinians and they were left to camp on exposed hillsides in the middle of winter with limited supplies. Faced with international criticism for their action, the Israelis eventually allowed the deportees to return in small groups over a period of months.

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A new government in Israel

Although the peace talks had stalled during 1992, there had been a significant change in the policy of Israel. The coalition government of Yitzhak Shamir was defeated in the June 1992 election by Yitzhak Rabin's Labour Party, which had campaigned with a promise to reach an agreement on Palestinian autonomy within a year. Rabin, who as Defence Minister had authorised the "break bones" policy at the beginning of the Intifada, had come to realise that the uprising could not be subdued by force. In addition, there was a growing view in the Rabin cabinet that the emerging Hamas was more of a threat to Israeli interests than the now more moderate PLO. Defusing Hamas' power required a willingness to speak directly to the PLO, and following the election the official policy of no contact with the PLO was gradually ignored. A demographic time bomb was also ticking away for the Israelis. In Greater Israel (comprising Israel and the Occupied Territories) the Palestinian birth rate stood at 38 per 1000 at the start of the 1990s. The Israeli birthrate was 22 per 1000. By the turn of the century the Arab-born would count for at least half of Israel's population. Even the best equipped, most dedicated Israeli army could not hope to keep half a nation in a state of permanent subjection. Although the answer of some Israeli extremists was to expel the Palestinians, at the point of a gun if necessary, a more rational course impelled the Israelis to negotiate with the PLO.

From the Palestinian point of view, Arafat's need to win back the financial support of the Gulf States pushed him towards negotiations, as progress in the peace talks was a condition demanded by the Gulf States before financial assistance could be resumed. The continued demise of the Soviet Union robbed the PLO of an alternative superpower patron; therefore, good relations had to be restored with the USA.

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The Oslo Accords

From January 1993, a series of secret meetings took place in Oslo (the "Oslo Channel") involving representatives of the PLO and the Israeli government. On 29 August 1993, agreement was reached on the following terms:

On 13 September 1993, in front of the world's press on the White House lawn, Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Arafat and President Clinton of the USA formally signed the Accords, and the Israeli Prime Minister finally, if somewhat hesitantly, shook the hand of his Palestinian counterpart.

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Reaction to the Accords

Within Israel reaction was mixed. The deal was opposed by Benjamin Netanyahu, the new Likud leader, and strongly rejected by the 115,000 Israeli settlers of the settlements in the Occupied Territories. An opinion poll taken in response to the publication of the Accords showed that 53% of Israeli Jews supported the plan, while 44% opposed it. Rabin said: "They are murderers, but you make peace with your enemies.... We have to take risks."[8]

In the Occupied Territories many Palestinians supported Arafat, although others felt that he had sold out their long-term hopes. Hamas announced, "We will never agree to be part of this game."[9] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) said that they would resist Palestinian autonomy as strongly as they had resisted Israeli occupation.

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The negotiations falter

The Washington Agreements had envisaged that Palestinian control of the Gaza Strip and Jericho would begin after three months. However, as the 13 December deadline approached, it became obvious that the symbolism of the White House handshake had become bogged down in the practical details of the Accord's implementation. Three main issues remained unresolved:

In February 1994, Arafat and Peres signed an agreement in Cairo which gave Israel overriding control and responsibility for the security of the border crossings and surrounding areas, and for the Jewish settlements in Gaza. There would be a Palestinian presence at the border terminals, and a 15,000 strong Palestinian police force would take over security duties inside the self-rule area. Diplomatic moves were also afoot on a wider scale.

At the end of January 1994 Clinton met President Assad in an effort to bring Syria back to the Middle East negotiating table. A "chicken and egg" situation bedevilled attempts to broker an agreement between Israel and Syria. Syria would not promise a full peace with normal relations until the Israelis completely withdrew from the Golan Heights. This the Israelis were unwilling to do until they had the required promise from the Syrians!

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Rising extremism

Negotiations after September 1993 were being carried out against a background of rising violence. An unlikely alliance had emerged between extremists in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Right-wing Israelis and fundamentalist Palestinians shared a vehement opposition to the peace process; the Israelis because it gave away more than they wished, and the Palestinians because it granted less than they sought. Instead of pulling troops out of the Occupied Territories, Rabin was forced to send in 5,000 more because of the inter-community violence. When Israeli security forces killed two leaders of Hamas, riots exploded in the Gaza Strip. Angry Jewish settlers were accusing Rabin of appeasement and some were attacking Arab communities.

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The Hebron Massacre

The peace process was brought to a temporary halt by the actions of an Israeli fanatic in the West Bank town of Hebron. Hebron lies in what, to many Jews, are the Biblical lands of Judea and Samaria. These lands (sometimes referred to as Eretz Yisrael) were, they believe, given to the Jews by God and must therefore not be involved in any "land for peace" deal. Jews had been driven out of Hebron in 1929, when an Arab mob murdered 60 of their number. In 1968 Rabbi Moshe Levinger led 32 families into the city, ostensibly to celebrate Passover—they never left. Many of these new settlers took up residence in the small settlement of Kiryat Arba, just outside Hebron, which became a centre for Jewish extremism. Baruch Goldstein emigrated from New York to Israel in 1983. He was a doctor, but his hostility to Arabs was so intense that he refused to treat Arab patients. Goldstein was linked to the extremist Kach party, founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane, a zealot who preached the removal of Arabs from Greater Israel. (Kahane was shot dead in New York by an Arab assassin in 1990.)

On Friday 25 February 1994, Goldstein entered the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, a holy place for both Muslims and Jews. He opened fire on the praying crowd, killing 29 people. He was eventually overcome and beaten to death by the crowd within the shrine. The shooting provoked riots throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip in which further Palestinians were killed by security forces. In Kiryat Arba, Goldstein was hailed as a hero and a martyr.

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Autonomy and the end of the Intifada

Although the peace talks faltered for a time after the Hebron massacre, a major step forward was taken on 4 May 1994, when Arafat and Rabin signed another accord in Cairo agreeing to the terms for Palestinian self-rule. In the presence of President Mubarak of Egypt, US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher and other dignitaries, last minute disputes over the map of Jericho saw Arafat temporary leave the ceremony, only to return and complete the signing. The accord called for negotiations towards a permanent settlement for the rest of the West Bank, gave the Palestinians the right to make laws and collect taxes, but kept control of the Jewish settlements and the border crossings to Egypt and Jordan in the hands of the Israelis.

Soon after the signing, Israel began to withdraw its troops from the specified area, this marked the end of the Intifada. The youths who had spent years throwing stones at Israelis were now reported as cleaning the streets of the accumulated rubble of over six years in preparation for their new, autonomous existence.

On Friday 1 July Yasser Arafat flew from his base in Tunis to make a symbolic return to the Gaza Strip. While there was elation in much of Gaza, thousands of right-wing Israelis rampaged through East Jerusalem vandalising Arab property, stoning a US consulate building, burning pictures of Arafat and denouncing him as a murderer. Their anger was also turned against Rabin, denounced once again as a traitor to his people.

Negotiations continued over the following months as Palestinian control was extended. At the end of August the new Palestinian Authority was given control over five areas of life in the larger West Bank: education, health, taxation, tourism and social welfare.

The limitations of Palestinian influence were emphasised in two incidents from this time, one farcical and the other of greater importance. President Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan announced her intention of visiting the Gaza Strip while touring the region. The Israelis took offence because she had not asked them first for permission to do so. Announcing that, "The lady from Pakistan must be taught some manner", Rabin refused to allow the visit.[10] The Palestinians had to acquiesce in this decision which emphasised the nature of their limited autonomy; in matters of foreign policy all power still lay with the Israelis.

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The Israeli-Jordan Peace Treaty

Of greater significance was the Peace Treaty signed on Wednesday 26 October between Jordan and Israel. This was only the second peace treaty made between Israel and an Arab state (the first being with Egypt in 1979). By recognising Jordan's role as the guardian of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, the treaty pleased King Hussein but angered the Palestinians, who claimed that right for themselves. A general strike followed in the West Bank to protest against the signing. Other Arab states began to follow Jordan's lead in dismantling their hostility to Israel. In October Tunisia announced low-level diplomatic contacts, while the Gulf states indicated that they would drop their indirect economic boycott. Morocco also expressed a desire for friendlier relations.

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Hamas violence intensifies

A significant problem for the new Palestinian Authority was the further emergence of Hamas. The organisation's military wing (called 'Izzedin al-Kassam' after an Islamic militant who was killed by the British police in Palestine in 1935) displayed a growing trend of religious fanaticism, ruthlessness and tight organisation. On 6 April 1994, seven people were killed when a Hamas suicide car bomb detonated next to an Israeli bus. A week later a man with explosives strapped to his body blew himself up in a bus, killing five. On 2 October, another bus bomb in Tel Aviv killed 22.

Increasing Israeli concern over the role of Hamas came to a head on Tuesday 11 October, when the group kidnapped an Israeli soldier, Nachshon Waxman. The kidnappers demanded the release from Israeli gaols of their leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin and 200 other Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners. They timed the event to coincide with the ceremony for the award of the Nobel Peace to Arafat, Peres and Rabin in Stockholm. Waxman was killed when Israeli troops stormed the house in the West Bank where he was being held. In reaction, Israel suspended the peace talks and closed the Gaza Strip. Rabin warned that autonomy would not be expanded to the rest of the West Bank if violence went unchecked and urged Arafat to control Hamas. Palestinian security forces arrested about 200 Hamas activists. Despite its superior firepower, an extensive intelligence network and a willingness to use draconian measures, the Israelis had never been able to subdue Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Now they expected Arafat's far less sophisticated force to achieve that goal.

On 18 November, Arafat's police force in Gaza city opened fire for the first time on Palestinian protesters, killing at least 11 and wounding 200 in street battles. It was the worst internal violence since the PLO had taken control in Gaza.

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1995 autonomy and assassination

The new year opened with frustration on both sides of the peace process. Israeli redeployment from Arab towns in the West Bank was six months behind schedule and Israel was looking increasingly reluctant to remove its troops. On 22 January a car carrying explosives blew up as it passed an Israeli bus near a Jewish settlement south of Gaza city. At least six were killed and 23 wounded. The extremist group Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. A second suicide bomb attack followed in April. The borders between Israel and Gaza, closed after the January attack, remained shut. The attacks were condemned by both the PLO and Israel. "We are committed to confronting terrorism. These people are the enemies of peace," said Arafat.[11]

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The expansion of Israeli settlements

Israeli good faith in the peace negotiations was called into question by an expansion of their land settlement schemes. In April, land in the sensitive area of East Jerusalem was earmarked for confiscation as part of an Israeli policy to surround the city, including its Arab sector, with new Jewish settlements intended to block any future redivision of the city. This, the first outright confiscation of land in East Jerusalem since 1991, brought strong international condemnation in the United Nations. In the face of this criticism the Israeli government backed away from further confiscations by the end of May.

Deadlines came and went without any advancement of Palestinian self-rule. A 1 July deadline for an autonomy agreement relating to the West Bank was not met. Both sides wondered whether the 1993 accord had been worth it. Only 45% of Israelis still favoured the peace accord in April 1995, down from 61% at the time it was signed. In the Gaza Strip it was felt that conditions had worsened. In response to suicide bombings Israel had limited the numbers of Palestinians working in Israel, reducing them from 100,000 to 29,000. Trade with Israel had been sharply curtailed by border closings, and the unemployment rate in Gaza was 58%. Despite these security measures it was impossible to stop the determined suicide bomber. On 24 July, another suicide bus bomb in Tel Aviv killed six passengers and injured another 28. Israeli anger was turned against Arafat as the Israelis once more demanded that he control the extremists within his territory.

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Arafat's leadership style questioned

For their part, the Palestinian authorities were trying to crack down on the militants. Arafat once again condemned the bus bombings as terrorist activity. Political speeches in mosques were banned and hundreds of Islamic activists imprisoned. There was even cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian intelligence services. Seemingly unable to control fully the activities of the terrorist groups, Arafat's leadership style came under criticism. His ability to transform himself from a roving terrorist leader to an establishment president was questioned. It was alleged that, although Arafat had created the Palestinian Authority to govern the newly autonomous region, he kept power centralised in his hands. The bottle-neck in decision-making which had resulted, plus government appointments based on political loyalty rather than competence, had led to worsening conditions in Gaza. The postal and telephone systems were in chaos, building construction was unregulated, and fewer taxes were being collected than in the times of Israeli occupation.

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An Accord signed

Finally, in September came the long awaited breakthrough when Israel and the Palestinians signed an accord agreeing to extend Palestinian self-rule on the West Bank. This accord paved the way for more than 2 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jericho to hold their first elections for a Palestinian council. Thousands of Israeli troops were to withdraw from Arab towns and villages in the West Bank by March 1996. Furthermore, in May 1996, both sides were to start discussing the major contentious issues between them: the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories; the fate of Palestinians in the refugee camps; and the status of Jerusalem.

Progress in the peace agreements could not come too soon for the situation in Gaza:

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The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin

At the beginning of November 1995, Israel was bracing itself for a retaliatory strike from Palestinian extremists after Mossad (the Israeli Secret Service) agents had gunned down Fathi Shiqaqi, the leader of the Islamic Jihad movement, in Malta. However, the blow to the state, when it came, was delivered from an entirely unexpected quarter.

On 4 November, Yitzhak Rabin had just finished addressing a peace rally of 100,000 people in a Tel Aviv square when he was gunned down as he returned to his car. It emerged that the assassin, Yigal Amir, had links with extreme rightist groups in Israel who had increasingly criticised Rabin for his pursuit of the peace process. Opposition to the peace process within Israel had taken on a violent tone. In rallies throughout the country extremists had branded Rabin as a traitor and carried effigies of him in a Nazi uniform; militant rabbis had encouraged soldiers to disobey orders relating to the vacating of army bases; and in Florida a group of Hasidic rabbis had been chastised by the Israeli consulate for openly declaring that they would welcome Rabin's death.[12]

For the extremists, such as the assassin Amir, Rabin had committed the ultimate act of betrayal in September when he signed the agreement ceding control of sections of the West Bank (parts of Eretz Yisrael) to the Palestinians. While to the extremists it was vital for Israel to hang on to these sacred lands, for Rabin and his government it was thought destructive to the meaning of the Jewish state to absorb a large Arab minority which would comprise as much as 35% of the electorate. Far better, they thought, to secure a smaller but distinctly Jewish state living at peace with its Palestinian neighbours.

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Reactions to Rabin's death

Reactions to the assassination varied across the Middle East. The leaders of Egypt and Jordan condemned the act. However, in Lebanon shots were fired in the air in celebration, and in Palestinian refugee camps there was dancing and singing. 'I am not sorry for the killing of Rabin, who is the world's number one terrorist,' said Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, the successor as Islamic Jihad leader to the recently assassinated Fathi Shiqaqi.[13]

In Israel the major question was whether the peace process would survive the assassination. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres succeeded Rabin as Prime Minister, determined that the peace process should continue. Doubts were expressed in the international media about Peres' ability to carry on Rabin's policies. Peres was a professional politician, not a former military hero as Rabin had been, and was therefore less likely to appeal to the more hawkish voters in Israel as Rabin had done. Only Rabin, it was said, could comfortably beat the opposition Likud party in the November 1996 elections to keep the peace process on track.

For a time after Rabin's death there was a revulsion in Israel against the extremism which had led to the assassination. In this context the autonomy agreement moved slowly forward. Israeli troops pulled out of the West Bank town of Jenin in November; Tulkarm and Qalqilya in December and Bethlehem in time for Christmas. Renewed overtures were put out to Syria and, after a six-month freeze in negotiations, it was announced that Israel and Syria would resume talks on 27 December.

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The Palestinian elections

Campaigning began for the long awaited Palestinian self-rule elections, set down for 20 January 1996. The people were voting for the members of a Palestinian Council and for a president. Arafat, with 87% of the vote, easily defeated his only challenger for the presidency (Sameeha Khalil, the 72-year-old founder of a charity on the West Bank) and was sworn in on Monday 12 February as the first President of the Palestinian autonomous region. A high voter turnout in the elections delivered a major blow to militant Muslim groups which had refused to stand candidates. "This is the foundation stone of the Palestinian state; this is a new era," said Mr. Arafat.[14] As one election seemed to cement the peace process in place, so another was contemplated. Confident that he could exploit the apparent rejection of extremism in Israel following Rabin's death, Peres brought forward the general election to 29 May 1996.

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A return to violence

Unfortunately for the advocates of the peace process, the pendulum was about to swing against them. On 25 February 1996, a Hamas bus bomb in Jerusalem killed 23 people. Another blast, 15 minutes later, killed two others at a soldier's hitch-hiking post at Ashkelon. The attacks were in retaliation for the assassination of Yahya Ayyash, a Hamas bomb maker known as"'the engineer" for his role in masterminding previous bus bombings.

The Israeli reaction was temporarily to seal off the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, another suicide bomb on 4 March, in a crowded shopping centre in Tel Aviv, killed 13 people. The right-wing extremist voices were heard again in Israel. Crowds chanted: 'Peres is a murderer. Peres is a traitor. Peres is next in line.'[15]

Politically, Peres found himself in a difficult position. Having advanced the date of the election to exploit the sympathy for the peace process after Rabin's death, he saw the chance of victory disappearing rapidly as the call for revenge intensified with every bus bomb.

Needing a show of strength, Peres ordered a crackdown, in areas of the West Bank still under Israeli rule. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank were again sealed off, and the homes of Islamic radicals were blown up. Arafat's Palestinian Authority responded with the arrest of hundreds of Islamic activists. On 13 March, 29 international leaders gathered at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt for a "Summit of the Peacemakers" conference against terrorism. The real importance of the gathering lay in the symbolism of Arab states standing with Israel against Islamic suicide bombers.

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The Israeli election, May 1996

For the first time in the country's history the Israeli electorate were given two votes: one directly for a prime minister and one for the parliamentary party of their choice. In the prime ministerial ballot Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the Likud party, won with 50.5% of the vote, against 49.5% for the Labour leader Shimon Peres. The difference was a mere 30,000 votes in an electorate of 3.1 million, but the small margin was to have major effects on the future of the peace process. Ironically, if Israel had not changed its electoral law in 1992, Peres would have retained the prime ministerial position. Labour won 34 seats, Likud won 32. Under the old system, as the leader of the largest party, Peres would have been invited to form a government. This honour passed to Netanyahu who, after a negotiating process lasting over two weeks, put together a coalition government which represented a cross-section of conservative to extreme orthodox religious opinion.

Netanyahu won the election because his promise to emphasise security captured the mood of an Israeli people grown increasingly nervous after a series of Hamas terrorist bombs had killed 59 people over eight days during March. Thomas Friedman, writing in the New York Times, summed up the result of the election in four words, "the bad guys won!"[16] The "bad guys" were the Jewish and Muslim extremists who opposed the peace process and had made Netanyahu's victory possible and a slowing down of the peace process likely.

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Netanyahu's background

The new Prime Minister was 46 years old, the grandson of a Jewish Lithuanian who had arrived in Palestine in 1920. At the age of 14 Benjamin moved with his family to the USA. After graduation he returned to Israel to serve in an elite special forces unit which, in 1972, stormed a hijacked jet on the tarmac at Tel Aviv airport. His brother Jonathan was killed in 1976, while leading the team that rescued the passengers of a hijacked plane at Entebbe airport in Uganda. As a result, it was said, Benjamin detested Yasser Arafat, then the leader of the Palestinian terrorists and now, as Palestinian President, his negotiating partner in the peace process. After serving as Israel's ambassador to the United Nations from 1984 to 1988, and as a cabinet minister from 1988 to 1992, Benjamin Netanyahu succeeded Yitzhak Shamir as Likud leader in 1992.

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A new approach to peace

Although proclaiming his belief in the peace process, Netanyahu quickly established new ground rules for negotiation which differed markedly from the Rabin/Peres approach. He rejected Rabin's 'land for peace' formula, lifted the four-year-old restrictions on new or expanded settlements on the West Bank, abandoned any thought of a retreat from the Golan Heights, and pre-empted further discussion on two key issues by declaring that there would be no national sovereignty for the Palestinians and no discussions on the future of Jerusalem as it would remain under full Israeli control. These policies reflected the new conservative view in the Israeli government; they also illustrated the growing importance of the religious right who now, in return for supporting Netanyahu, wanted governmental support on religious and social issues.

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The isolation of Arafat

Yasser Arafat's continuing prestige among the Palestinians depended upon his ability to deliver peace and land. Through the (northern) summer of 1996 his position became increasingly difficult as Netanyahu, whether through government policy or personal antipathy, sought to humiliate the Palestinian leader. Netanyahu refused to meet Arafat and even grounded his helicopter, used to convey him from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank. In August, the Israeli cabinet approved an expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and a Palestinian community centre in East Jerusalem was shut down.

Arafat was being frozen out. The militant Hamas denigrated him as a collaborator, calling on the Palestinians to rebel against his authority.[17] This division within the Palestinian ranks was sharpened following the death in custody of a Palestinian activist who had been tortured by members of the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian police opened fire on demonstrating crowds in Tulkarm.

The deadlock in the peace process and the isolation of Arafat caused concern both at home and abroad. In early September the Israeli President, Ezer Weizman, attempted to break the deadlock by meeting Arafat. This, plus pressure from abroad, forced Netanyahu to alter his stance. Later that month, at a checkpoint at the entrance to the Gaza Strip, Netanyahu met Arafat. A symbolic handshake was exchanged, but there was no movement in the positions of the two sides. The diplomatic standoff continued and tensions grew, prompted by events not only on the ground but under it.

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The Tunnel Affair, September 1996

The ancient city of Jerusalem contains many areas of fascination to the tourist and the archaeologist. One of these was an ancient tunnel linking the holy places of three religions: the Western Wall of Herod's Jewish temple, Islam's Dome of the Rock and the Christian Via Dolorosa. The tunnel had existed for years with one entrance/exit. Suddenly, under cover of darkness and without consultation with Muslim religious leaders, the Jewish authorities opened another entrance in the Muslim quarter of the city. Alarmed, Palestinians alleged that the new excavations threatened the foundations of the Dome of the Rock. They did not, but that was not the point. This latest example of insensitivity by the Israelis was the signal for the release of the pent up frustration of the Palestinians, who had seen no progress in their cause since the election of Netanyahu.

This frustration was exacerbated by the economic distress being felt in the occupied territories. For seven months Israel, in response to terrorist attacks, had curtailed the number of Palestinians allowed to cross the border to work in Israel. This had contributed to a 50% unemployment rate among Palestinians.

Violence flared throughout the West Bank and Gaza with some of the worst clashes coming in Ramallah, where armed Palestinian police joined the rioting Arab youths. Over four days, 59 Palestinians and 14 Israelis died. Each side blamed the other. Netanyahu was widely criticised, even within Israel, for his insensitivity over the tunnel issue. Arafat was accused of giving the green light to violence and deliberately stirring up his own people. The widespread violence galvanised the United States into action, and President Clinton convened a summit in Washington with Arafat, Netanyahu and King Hussein of Jordan. Little was achieved, the end result being a declaration on the renunciation of violence and an agreement to open-ended negotiations on easing the Israeli presence in Hebron.

The remaining months of 1996 saw no further violence or progress in the peace process. Charles Holmes, writing in the New York Times, offered these alternative interim assessments of Netanyahu's first six months of power:

"Almost single-handedly... Benjamin Netanyahu has destroyed the hard won progress Israel had made towards peace with the Arabs and moved the Middle East closer to war. OR he has pursued a realistic peace policy that makes Israel less susceptible to terrorism and the Jewish state less vulnerable at its borders."[18]

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Notes

1 Time, 30 November 1987: 33.

2 ibid., 4 January 1988: 49.

3 ibid., 1 February 1988: 20.

4 ibid., 4 January 1988: 50.

5 ibid., 29 February 1988: 21.

6 ibid., 26 December 1988: 9.

7 ibid., p. 10.

8 ibid., 13 September 1993: 27.

9 ibid.

10 Sydney Morning Herald, 31 August 1994.

11 ibid., 10 April 1995.

12 ibid., 6 November 1995.

13 ibid.

14 ibid., 22 January 1996.

15 Weekly Telegraph, 28 February 1996.

16 Reprinted in Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 1996.

17 Ibid., 5 August 1996.

18 Reprinted in Sydney Morning Herald, 30 December 1996.

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