Modern History
Home > Modern History > Core Study > World War I and its Aftermath 1914 - 1919: A Source-based Study > Peace movements and World War I - The Papal Peace Note - August 1917
This tutorial:
- describes the role of key features, issues, individuals, groups and events of World War 1 (H1.1)
- analyses and evaluates the role of key features, issues, individuals, groups and events of World War 1 (H1.2)
- uses historical terms and concepts appropriately (H4.1)
- explains and evaluates differing perspectives and interpretations of the past (H3.4)
From this tutorial you will learn about peace movements and one significant attempt to end World War I through negotiation in 1917.
Relevance to new syllabus:
In the previous syllabus this topic was listed as a separate dot-point. Though the Papal Peace Note is not specifically mentioned in the current syllabus it is still worth studying under the above syllabus outcomes. The Papal Peace Note represented one of a number of serious attempts to end the war in 1917. It may be useful for students to compare the proposals in the Papal Peace Note with those of President Wilson in his pre-US entry 'Peace Without Victory' speech of 22 January 1917 and his 'Reply to the Papal Peace Note' of 27 August 1917 and to consider why Wilson advocated a negotiated peace in January 1917, as the best outcome for the war, but rejected out-of-hand any possibility of a negotiated peace when it was proposed by the Pope in August 1917. Also, a number of historians have asserted that President Wilson's proposals for ending the war in his 'Fourteen Points' speech borrowed heavily from the Pope's Note and the twenty proposals put forward by the International Women's Congress in the Hague in 1915. A look at these documents would enable students to come to their own conclusions.
The Papal Peace Note
Most people have heard of Pope Pius XII and the controversy surrounding his inaction in regard to the Holocaust in the Second World War. In 1999 John Cornwell reignited the controversy with the publication of a book on Pius.[1] However, few people have heard of the Pope of the First World War, Benedict XV, or his Peace Note of August 1917. Few people know that Benedict's peace initiative was perhaps the most significant attempt by a neutral to end the Great War by negotiation.
The Papal Peace Note was not the first peace move in the First World War, but it was the first one that included concrete proposals for a settlement. It was to be another six months before anyone else was publicly to state firm proposals to end the conflict, when President Wilson made his famous 'Fourteen Points' speech.[2]
Though Benedict's peace move attracted widespread attention during 1917, and was an ongoing news item in the European and American press in the second half of 1917, it has received little recognition in many texts on the First World War. This is not to say that historians have ignored the Papal Peace Note. There has been some historical writing on the Papal Peace Note in the context of war aims and peace diplomacy, however, general histories of the war have tended to overlook Pope Benedict's role in attempting to secure peace in 1917. Also, general histories have tended to accept the slurs made against Benedict's character by the right-wing press and some Allied government leaders during the war.
Early biographies on Benedict XV were sympathetic to the Pope and his peace efforts, but because people within the Catholic hierarchy wrote them, have had little impact on World War One historians. The British historian, John Pollard, writing from outside the Catholic tradition, has attempted to redress this imbalance and has written a biography on Benedict titled appropriately, The Unknown Pope. [3]
In September 1914 Della Chiesa was elected to the papacy and took the name of Benedict XV. From the outset Benedict was concerned about the war, and from 1914 to 1916 was involved in humanitarian efforts to alleviate the effects of the war as well as peace discussions with other neutrals and various peace activists. [4] After the failure of the American and German peace moves at the end of 1916 and with the growing strength of socialist attempts to end the war, Benedict began preparations for a public appeal for peace in 1917.
Benedict wanted his peace appeal to include specific proposals. Between May and July 1917 Benedict used his diplomatic contacts with Austria-Hungary and Germany to try to get the Central Powers' commitment to a number of key points which would lend credibility to the peace move. The Pope was also careful to include other items in his Note such as the "liberty and community of the seas" which were aimed to appeal to President Wilson who constantly mentioned the need to secure the "freedom of the seas" at the end of the war. Benedict was hoping that the public nature of his planned appeal would lead to an irresistible popular pressure on all the belligerent governments to come to the negotiating table.
The Pope was motivated by the following considerations in his desire to seek a negotiated end to the Great War:
- humanitarian concern for all those suffering,
especially innocent civilians
- interest in the survival of Dual Monarchy of
Austria-Hungary, as it was a bastion of Catholicism in
Europe and a counter-balance to Germany in Central Europe
- fear that socialist attempts to end the war, currently
under way (i.e., the Stockholm Conference), would increase
the influence of socialism in the post-war world
- fear that if the war did not end soon then the future of European civilisation (and Catholicism) would be at risk and violent revolution would engulf Europe.
In Germany some groundwork had been done to prepare the way for the Papal Note.
- Matthias Erzberger, a Centre Party (Catholic)
politician working on his own initiative, had been
instrumental in getting the Reichstag Peace Resolution
passed on 19 July 1917. 62% of Germany's Reichstag
deputies voted in favour of a "peace with no
annexations" similar to the declaration made by the
Russian socialists in April 1917 (i.e., the "Petrograd
Formula").
- Eugenio Pacelli, the Pope's representative in Germany (later to become Pius XII), conducted a number of discussions with the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and his successor, Michaelis, in an attempt to get a German undertaking that they would evacuate Belgium in the event of a peace settlement. Both made encouraging statements. [5] Pacelli also had a discussion with the Kaiser. The results of Pacelli's diplomacy were inconclusive. However, Benedict decided to press ahead as he felt the time was ripe for a peace initiative.
The Peace Note was dated 1 August but may not have been fully composed until 8 August. The Allied governments were given advance notice via cable of the gist of the Note sometime after 11 August. The news of the Note caused panic in Allied government circles because its publication could lead to a public debate on war aims, something the Allied governments were not prepared to do at this stage. In Britain an emergency meeting of the War Cabinet was held to discuss the Papal Peace Note and how best it could be handled. The governments of Britain, France and Italy were concerned about the following:
- Coming up with a reply to the Papal Note would entail a
discussion of their war aims and perhaps a disclosure of
their secret treaties.
- Many of the Pope's proposals were similar to
President Wilson's peace statements made, as a neutral,
in December 1916 and January 1917. If Wilson gave any
backing to the Papal Note, then the Allied governments
would be under enormous pressure to revise their war aims
and consider a negotiated peace.
- Public pressure for peace at a time when war weariness
is at its height. What would be the reaction of Catholics
in Britain? What about Catholic reaction in Ireland?
- The Russians feared that a negotiated peace made on the basis of the Papal Note would be at the expense of Russia. They were quick to urge Wilson to reject the Pope's proposals. Note there was always a level of religious rivalry between the Vatican and orthodox Russia and a certain amount of mistrust.
As a result of their secret discussions the British War Cabinet decided to make no official response to the Papal Note and wait for the replies of the Central Powers.
Sometime after 15 August all the belligerent governments received the full text of the Papal Note as did the press. Newspapers across Europe and America carried headlines about the Papal Note and contained the full text of the Note (see a summary of the Note below). There was much public discussion about the Pope's proposals. In the US and in Britain the patriotic press attacked the Papal Note with the slur that it was "Austrian-inspired" and that the Pope's neutrality and even-handedness were suspect. Therefore, the right-wing patriotic press reasoned that the Note must be shunned. The left-wing liberal and the socialist press in Britain, however, saw the Papal Note as a great opportunity for the Allies to reformulate their war aims and make a positive reply. This, the liberals and socialists reasoned, would put pressure on the Central Powers to respond positively to the Note or risk social unrest.
The key to the whole affair hinged on the response of President Wilson. Since many of the Pope's statements were similar to pronouncements President Wilson had made about the war while still a neutral, it seemed feasible that the American president might respond positively to the Vatican peace initiative. Surprisingly, President Wilson expressed annoyance at the Pope's appeal and told his advisers that he was inclined to make no reply at all. [6] However, after canvassing the opinions of numerous senators and members of his own staff, Wilson became convinced of the propaganda value of making a public reply. On 27 August 1917 President Wilson's reply to the Pope was impressive, and its impact was as dramatic as the Papal Note had been (see the summary of Wilson's reply below). However, Wilson rejected a peace based on the Pope's proposals and implied that there was no chance of peace until the German people overthrew their government.
The Allied governments were relieved at Wilson's rejection of Benedict's peace initiative and were content to allow Wilson's reply to be theirs also, although they were not happy about Wilson's condemnation of secret treaties and economic war, which were directed at the Allied governments. Britain, France, Italy and Russia therefore made no formal reply, preferring to allow President Wilson to be their spokesman on this occasion.
In Germany the Papal Note caused intense discussions in the Reichstag. A "Committee of Seven" was formed to discuss the Papal Note with the Chancellor Michaelis. After weeks of further discussion in government circles the German and Austrian governments made official replies to the Papal Note on 19 and 20 September.[7] However, they were sufficiently vague on details (particularly about Belgium) that they were open to attack by the Allied governments for being insincere. The Central Powers thus failed to take the diplomatic initiative by making a clear positive reply which would have put the Allied governments under pressure from their people to negotiate on the Pope's proposals.
Historians generally agree that Wilson's rejection of Benedict's peace initiative was the main reason for its failure. The Central Powers' replies to the Note did not mark the end of the affair. [8] There were two secret peace feelers, one from Britain and France and the other from Germany, that grew out of this affair. Also the British and Italian governments were constantly called to account by opposition groups in parliament for their failure to reply to the Papal Note. Even more dramatic was the revelation late in 1917 [9] that there existed a secret clause in the Treaty of London (1915) in which Britain, France and Russia pledged to work with Italy to reject any Vatican peace initiative.
It is interesting to consider whether a Papal Peace in 1917 would have led to a more lasting settlement than the peace that was negotiated at Versailles in 1919.
Below is a summary of the main points of the Papal Note.
Note of His Holiness the Pope to the Belligerents, 1 August 1918 [10]
"We wish now to come to more concrete and practical proposals, and to invite the Governments of the belligerent peoples to come to an agreement upon the following points, which it would seem should be the bases of a just and lasting peace, leaving it to them to settle and complete the details."
- Disarmament: "A simultaneous and reciprocal
reduction of armaments according to rules and guarantees to
be established."
- Arbitration: "according to standards to be agreed
upon and sanctions to be determined against the State which
should refuse either to submit international questions to
arbitration or to accept the decision."
- "The true liberty and community of the seas, which
on the one hand would eliminate numerous causes of
conflict, and, on the other hand, would open to everybody
new sources of prosperity and progress." [11]
- Each side to pay for its own reconstruction to be
funded by the reduction in armaments. "It would be
impossible to understand the continuation of such carnage
solely for economic reasons." Where special cases
exist they "should be considered in the light of
justice and equity." So, disarmament would pay for
reconstruction of damaged areas except in special cases.
- Reciprocal restitution of occupied territories. Germany
should totally evacuate Belgium and French territory and
Germany's colonies should be returned. [12]
- In the contested territories [such as Alsace-Lorraine and between Italy and Austria] the aspirations of the people should be taken into account. [ie. by plebiscite] Armenia, the Balkan States and Poland should also be examined in a "conciliatory spirit."
A settlement on these principles would "render impossible a repetition of similar conflicts, and to prepare the way for the solution of the economic question, which is of so much importance for the future and the material well-being of all the belligerent States." [13]
The following is a summary of President Wilson's reply to the Pope.
President Wilson's Reply to the Pope's Peace Note, 27 August 1917 [14]
- The Pope's plan would not deliver a stable peace.
"This agony must not be gone through again, and it
must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us
against it." In other words, if Germany is not
thoroughly beaten now it will have to be done all over
again later.
- Rejected Pope's proposal to return to the
status quo ante bellum. This means returning to
Europe's pre-war borders. Wilson wanted a thorough
revision of borders to prevent future disputes.
-
The object of the war is to destroy the German Government
because:
- it started the war and secretly planned to dominate the world.
- "it is the ruthless master of the German people." [15]
- their word cannot be trusted.
- Germany could regain its strength after a period of
peace and so a "permanent hostile combination of
nations" would have to be created against Germany to
keep it in check.
- "New-born Russia" would be abandoned to
German influence and suffer a counter-revolution.
- "No peace can rest securely upon political or
economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and
cripple others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any
kind of revenge or deliberate injury."
- The test of a peace plan is whether it is based on the
will of the people or "merely upon the word of an
ambitious and intriguing government" [ie. the German
government]. The present rulers of Germany cannot be
trusted to guarantee anything. There must be
"conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the
German people themselves." [16]
- The United States Government seeks no material
advantage of any kind.
- The United States Government is opposed to "punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues", which are "in the end futile" and "no proper basis for a peace of any kind, lest of all an enduring peace. [17] That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind."
Notes
- [1] John Cornwell, Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII, New York, Viking, 1999.
- [2] Some historians have argued that Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech was influenced by the Papal Peace Note.
- [3] John Pollard, The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914–1922) and the Pursuit of Peace, London, Geoffrey Chapman, (1999). The two earlier biographies: Walter H. Peters, The Life of Benedict XV, Milwaukee, 1959; and Rev. Henry G. Rope, Benedict XV, London, John Gifford, 1941.
- [4] See Pollard for a detailed outline of all these activities. John Pollard, op. cit., pp. 112–139. Pollard also mentions the visit by the American peace activist, Jane Adams, in June 1915. See p. 118.
- [5] However, the fall of Bethmann-Hollweg in July 1917 and his replacement by Michaelis was a concern as the latter was an unknown. Benedict's fears were right. Michaelis ended up being far more under the thumb of Hindenburg and Ludendorff than Bethmann-Hollweg ever was.
- [6] Zivojinovic argued that Wilson's attitude was that, if anyone was going to mediate an end to the war, he wanted it to be himself. Wilson therefore viewed the Pope's attempts at mediation as interference in his domain. Zivojinovic, Dragan R. The United States and Vatican Policies 1914–1918. Boulder, Colorado University Press, 1978, p. 96.
- [7] John Snell has examined the reaction in Germany to Wilson's rejection of the Papal Note, particularly among socialist groups. John L. Snell, "Benedict XV, Wilson, Michaelis, and German Socialism." Catholic Historical Review 37 (April,1951–January 1952):151–178.
- [8] Britain and France via John De Salis, the British representative at the Vatican. The German offer referred to is the Kuhlmann peace offer of September. The secret terms of this peace offer were described by Foreign Minister Balfour as very favourable. No record of the secret War Cabinet meeting to discuss this offer at the end of September has survived. See Denis Winter, Haig's Command, London, Viking, 1991, p. 103.
- [9] Due to Trotsky's publications of the Allies' secret treaties in November 1917. See Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics, London, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 184.
- [10] G.L. Dickinson, op. cit., pp. 47ff.
- [11] In a subsequent interview Benedict equated his "liberty and community of the seas" with Wilson's "freedom of the seas". Benedict was deliberately using terms that would appeal to Wilson. He mistakenly saw Wilson as an ally in working for a negotiated peace.
- [12] In other words the Allies could use the German colonies as a bargaining chip to get Germany to relinquish Belgium. The British Government was very uncomfortable with this suggestion, having no intention of surrendering captured German territory.
- [13] Benedict was concerned about plans to wage economic war after hostilities. He would certainly have been thinking of the Paris Resolutions of June 1916 when the Allies pledged to wage an economic war against Germany once the military war was over.
- [14] Dickinson, op. cit., pp. 50f.
- [15] This was a theme ever since Wilson's war speech in April 1917. Wilson only saw the government of Germany as guilty and the war as a crusade to rid the world of the German government. This contrasted with the Allied governments who viewed the whole German race as guilty and therefore deserving of punishment.
- [16] This is a strong hint that the German people should overthrow the Kaiser and the military leadership and install a democratic government. Then perhaps a negotiated settlement could be made.
- [17] This is really a swipe at the Allied governments and their secret treaties and plans for an economic war after the fighting has stopped. The Allied leaders could not stomach this and similar statements made by Wilson.
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